With hindsight

The Battle of Crete is no different to any other in that people will revisit it with the benefit of hindsight to say what could have been done differently. Some of the views are my own, with some from official documents.

Site Map

Churchill on Freyberg

Strategic assessment WO 252/1201

War Office assessment, June 1941

Was the outcome inevitable?

When looking back on the events of May 1941 in Crete, it is easy to see where some of the mistakes were being made, hindsight works that way. The situation on Crete was to a large extent influenced by the events in Greece following the Italian and German invasions of that country, and in North Africa where General Wavell, C-in-C Middle East, could not afford to fail.

Following the defeat in Greece the Allies had to retreat via Crete to North Africa, as a result units were split up depending on whether or not they all got away, but also according to the convoy they were able to get on; some went to Crete some to Alexandria. Also, they were not all able to take their equipment so that many of the units on Crete would have to be used as infantry because they no longer had their specialized equipment. Having gone through one defeat and evacuation, many could see another poor situation developing when they arrived on Crete to find that again there was limited air support available.

Not only was air support very limited in the build up to the invasion, but also some of it was old (Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters) and operating from airfields that needed considerable improvement to support any large air arm. The aircraft were finally all withdrawn, but as the airfields were not destroyed they now had to be defended against the expected invasion. The Germans needed the airfields, especially Maleme, as a large part of their air landing force would be flown in by Ju52 transports. Had these air-transported troops been unable to land, with their heavier equipment, paratroops alone would have been unlikely to be able to have taken the island.

Military commanders in the Middle East, as well as those in London, were aware of the intentions of the Germans through the invaluable ULTRA intercepts, unfortunately the conflicting priority of North Africa prevented the air support being available in sufficient numbers to meet the invasion. Also, intelligence has to be interpreted, and Freyberg assessed the seaborne invasion mentioned in the intercepts as being as large a threat, if not larger, than the air-borne threat. This meant that he had to position a large part of his force to protect the beaches as well as the airfields, so reducing the force directly available to meet the paratroop threat when it was most vulnerable; in the air or forming up.

The lack of air support had a serious effect on the Navy, events around the island showed how vulnerable large naval vessels were to land based attack aircraft operating close to their own bases, and with no opposition from enemy fighters. The vulnerability surprised Naval commanders who had not expected their ships to be so easily sunk or damaged. This vulnerability pretty much limited the Navy to night operations, so seriously affecting their ability to support and re-supply the island.

When the invasion started the limitations of motorized transport available to the troops and the poor wireless communications between units exacerbated the problems of mutual support between the defence areas. The only communication between them was the single road running along the north coast of the island.

Freyberg and his senior commanders have been criticized for operating too far back from the changing front line, and so being unable to respond quickly and effectively when counter attacks by the Allies might have been decisive.

Churchill, who had been keen to have Freyberg command the troops on Crete, was critical of him later; "I am far from reassured about the tactical conduct of the defense by General Freyberg.... There appears to have been no counter-attack of any kind in the Western sector until more than 36 hours after the airborne descents had begun. There was no attempt to form a mobile reserve of the best troops.... The whole seems to have been of static defence of positions, instead of the rapid extirpation at all costs of the airborne landing parties."

In 1943 the Chief of Naval Operations released a large document which was a strategic analysis of the conduct of the battle, including a comprehensive section on the geography of the island, its coastline, and a lot of detailed maps and photographs. The document is available in the Public Records Office, Kew, under WO 252/1201. Also a short 7 page document was drawn up by the War Office for distribution among officers and Staff Groups, "Notes on the Fighting in Crete, and lessons to be drawn from it." Also available in the PRO under WO 287/164.

The following are a number of extracts from the Chief of Naval Operations study.

The analysis by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in April 1943 (WO 252/1201) stated that they believed there were two alternatives open to Freyberg;

a) Partially to disperse his force with a view to protecting both the aerodromes (Maleme & Heraklion) against an airborne and the beaches in their vicinity against a sea-borne attack.

b) To concentrate his force in four self-contained groups for the immediate defence of the three aerodromes and the base area at Suda.

Freyberg adopted the first. In order to meet the sea threat considerable dispersion was necessary west of Canea where the enemy might land at any point on the 12 miles stretch of beach. Dispositions of the NZ Division was influenced by that factor. The Commander of the 5th NZ brigade was very anxious about the area west of Maleme aerodrome and it was unfortunate that his intention to place a Greek battalion there had not been put into effect before the attack came.

They also wrote that "Perhaps the major lesson of this campaign was that to defend with a relatively small force an island as large as Crete, lying under the permanent domination of enemy fighter aircraft and out of range of our own was impossible."

Expanding on the Air Factor as they called it the study went on to say; "As an example of this close support and the detail with which its preparation is worked out, the following may be instanced. One glider company that landed in the Canea area had a whole flight of Stukas to support it. The task given to the flight was to bomb anti-aircraft and artillery positions and a group of houses which was the company's objective for three minutes. In addition, this company's operation was covered by twelve Me109 and six Me110 whose task was to neutralize anti-aircraft batteries and enemy ground troops.

It is considered that Crete could only have been defended if at least six fighter squadrons could have been kept up to strength. Was this possible? In view of the lamentable lack of preparation during the preparatory period, it was certainly not possible, at the last moment. But if, from the outset, the problem had been tackled with vision, something might have been achieved." To be fair, there had been many requests for aircraft to be based on the island, but these had been turned down in favour of the needs in North Africa. How well the airfields were equipped to handle these squadrons is a moot point.

"The committee are of opinion that until the eleventh hour no Service gave due weight to the preponderating factor affecting this problem, which was the overwhelming superiority of the German Air Force."

However, whatever the effect of the German air power, the study also had to have a passing swipe at discipline; "lax discipline has permeated many units ........ officers failed to exert the control that might have been expected of them. ....Drill still has its place, and should not, as it is by some, be associated solely with bows and arrows." This sentiment would probably be worthy of some study at some time, given that a large part of the force on Crete was made up of New Zealand and Australian forces who have a different approach to 'discipline' from the British Army, although this does not stop them fighting (Gallipoli and the Western Front). Many of the units had been evacuated from Greece, they were ill-equipped and knew they had no fighter cover. They probably felt ill-served by the various Army Staff units in Egypt and the UK.

Turning to some of the comments in WO 287/164. The lack of equipment, not helped by the fact that many of the troops had only recently evacuated from Greece, was noted; "Tools were totally inadequate, and wire was very limited." But they felt that "Middle East sent what they could in the way of supplies and equipment, but the impossibility of landing stores except for a few hours at night, combined with sinkings, prevented any substantial improvement of the situation being made." The short document went on to give a brief summary of the elements of the German attack, and then summarized it; "The defences were very light and owing to the lack of the necessary resources the ground opposition to air attack was not strong. In spite of this, very heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy. It is reported that our troops found the German infantryman no match in close fighting. [I think this is a little 'rich' on the part of the documents author, and not borne out by many of the individual records from soldiers. J Dillon] The capture of Maleme by the enemy was due as much to the intense air bombardment as to ground attack. The Germans made no landings or attacks by night. The deciding factors were the lack of fighter cover and the determination of the German air attack in the face of heavy casualties."

In Part II the short document gives "The Main Lessons Derived from the Airborne Attack on Crete", of which the following are extracts.

Fighter support is again stressed as essential, and reinforces the view many had that the only way the defence could have succeeded was if they had had this resource.

Morale of Parachute troops when dropped. The study recognizes that paratroops are at their most vulnerable before and shortly after they land, they need to be dealt with quickly before they have the opportunity to retrieve their weapons and form up into their units; "the general principle governing all operations against parachute troops must be an intense determination to seek them out and destroy them at once, and risks must be taken freely in order to do this." The assessment contains one sentence that should probably be viewed as having been written for an audience used to receiving war time propaganda; "The German parachute troops exhibited in marked degree the well known characteristics of their race - an intense dislike of the bayonet." I would suggest that most troops, British as well would not be partial to facing a bayonet attack, but then this was written in June 1941, a month after we had been forced off the island.

Artillery is recognized as necessary to allow defence in depth, and that this would have been useful for the defence of the airfields, but very little was available; "it was not as effective at Maleme because the only guns available were Italian 75's with indifferent Italian ammunition. The bursts of these pip-squeaks were very local and the shell fragmented very poorly." The paper also goes on to stress the need for concealment against the air attacks, and the need for trenches to be as small as possible.

It is difficult to see this particular War Office document adding a lot to the store of knowledge for the defence of an island against invasion. There is no real mention of tanks, communication equipment or how to co-ordinate the defenders who are in separate defence areas with limited transport and ability to offer mutual support.