A summary of messages from Naval Sources  (WO106/3241)

Freyberg needed to regain control of the airfield at Maleme if he was to be able to stop the German invasion.  To do this he agreed to the risky strategy above.  He would attack with only two battalions, at night, and one of these battalions, the 20th New Zealand (the other was the Maori 28th Battalion), had to come from the western side of Chania.  The transport needed for this move would not be available until the New Zealanders were relieved by an Australian battalion coming from Georgioupoli, the New Zealanders would then take over the transport from the Australians.  As this handover was not expected to happen until around midnight, it would be quite late before they could arrive for the planned attack.  An additional problem was the start line for the assault.  The forces currently in place around Maleme had German units on their right flank along the coastal area from Maleme to Platanias.  This meant that the new forces would need to traverse an area held or covered by the Germans before they could come up with those units they were supporting.

Signal from Freyberg to Wavell, 22 May.  "The position at Heraklion is that the enemy appears to have penetrated the town but, as far as can be ascertained, the aerodrome holds.  At Retimo we are still in a position to deny the enemy the use of the landing ground but the garrison is being attacked from the east.  A successful counter-attack was carried out this morning.  At Suda we are occupying a perimeter defence and are in fill possession of all our base organisation.

The move of the 20th NZ did not go to plan.  The Australian battalion had suffered air attacks and delay on their way to Chania, so the New Zealanders did not reach their start point for the attack until nearly 03:00.  The Maoris had been at their start point for some 3 hours, and the slow movement of the Australians to hand over their transport to the New Zealanders would result in the attack going ahead with only two companies (C & D) of the 20th Battalion.  While the hand over had been taking place in Chania between the two battalions, the flotilla of sea borne reinforcements for Von der Heydte at Maleme was intercepted and destroyed by the British fleet.  

The following is a quote from Sandy Thomas's book, 'Dare to be Free'; he was with 23 Battalion.  "We waited all that day, and all the next night for the expected orders to execute our planned role of the counter-attack on the aerodrome at Maleme.  We knew te 22nd Battalion was in grave peril there and that the main weight of the attack had come in against them.  But, even when two companies, sent up for reinforcements, returned to report the position confused, no orders were forthcoming.  It was not until early the next morning, when the men of the 22nd Battalion began to stream into our lines, that I realised the order never would be given.  Yet, without any doubt, the initiative up to that time was ours for the asking.  From that time the tide of battle began to swing in favour of the side with enterprise, and as that side was building up each hour and had such aerial supremacy as was never to be seen again, I began to see that the Battle of Crete might go against us.  I felt very bitter."

It is worth expanding a little on these delays.  Freyberg had all along been troubled by the threatened sea invasion which he believed to be the main thrust rather than the air drops.  After the war he said "We for our part were mostly preoccupied by seaborne landings, not by the threat of air landings".  Because of this concern he was not prepared to allow 20 Battalion to leave their position around Canea until they were relieved by the Australians (2/7 Battalion) from Georeoupolis, and he ordered Puttick (C.O. NZ Division) accordingly.  Unfortunately as mentioned above the Australians were delayed en-route by bombing and the result was the five companies became spread out.  According to Major Burrows (C.O. 20 Battalion) it was around 1 a.m. on the 22nd before the Australians had all arrived and completed the relief of his battalion.  Meanwhile Hargest at 5 brigade HQ was concerned that 20 Battalion were not arriving, his original plan had been for the advance of the two battalions to start at 1 a.m. (the time at which 20 were being relieved by the Australians).  Hargest was not aware of Freyberg's requirement for the full relief of 20 Battalion before they could move; "I did not know that the 20th had to be relieved by Australians, then embus and come 6 miles to me.  I was not told till very late."

The frustration of those involved in the counter-attack was made worse by the fact that they could see and hear the flashes of gunshot out to sea that were the obvious hallmarks of the Royal Navy preventing the expected sea invasion.  Requests to Puttick to move the 20th forward before their relief by 2/7 because of the events at sea, were turned down.  It is a pity that Freyberg did not have more faith in the Navy's ability to deal with any seaborne force.  They had destroyed the Italians at Matapan and evacuated Freyberg's men from Greece; they had a track record.

The history also takes a view on Freyberg's decision not to release the 20th earlier.  "The only real point for argument, therefore, is whether or not Freyberg and Puttick should have released 20 Battalion before the relief.  As events turned out it was disastrous not to do so.  But in a fair view it will be remembered how much importance naturally attached itself to the invasion by sea, and how difficult it must have been for a commander responsible for the defence of the coast to assume confidently that the Navy would be able to find and destroy the convoys sneaking across in the dark from the mainland."

At 03:30 the attack went ahead.  [See the account by a New Zealander, Tom Beel.] The 20th, under Brigadier Burrows, advanced on the seaward side of the road, and  were tasked to clear the airfield, while the Maori Battalion (28th), under Colonel Dittmer, was to retake Hill 107.  The attack was supported by three light tanks led by Lt. Farran.  The 20th met stiff resistance but did make slow progress.  The Maoris on their left made better progress as many of the Germans they had expected to meet had earlier withdrawn to the north, and were now hindering the 20th in their advance.  When the two forces of Burrow and Dittmer met it was starting to get light.  They decided that C Company (of 20th) would go for the north of Pirgos village, while D Company would attack the eastern edge of the airfield.  The Maoris would make their direct assault on Hill 107.  The tanks would go pretty much through the centre towards Pirgos, unfortunately they were quickly disabled making the C Company advance into the village very difficult.  Although the forces were advancing the failure of Hargest and Puttick to commit all available forces in the area to the attack was now causing the gains to be squandered.  Dittmer tried to get Leckie and Andrews with their 23rd and 22nd Battalions to support him and Burrows.  They declined, preferring to hold the ground they had.  The counter attack had come to a halt.  During the time that all this was going on Brigadier Hargest was signaling Division that he thought the Germans might be withdrawing!  Despite bitter fighting, the advance of the 20th turned into a withdrawal.  It would be a similar scenario for the 21st.  Although they initially made good progress towards Hill 107, by the afternoon they were forced to withdraw to Vineyard Ridge.  

'Sandy' Thomas comments in his book that the men of the 23rd Battalion "ex-farmers, ex-miners, ex-bank clerks who had come so far to do the job, felt sullenly critical of the powers that were withdrawing them."

All through these actions the troops had been suffering from the poor communications that were to plague them on Crete.  Companies could not stay in touch with themselves, or their Battalion HQ, and similarly, battalion could not stay in touch with Brigade.  This poor communication, and Hargest's optimistic nature must have been the cause of the signals he sent that morning which did not reflect the situation on the ground;

"Steady flow of enemy planes landing and taking off.  May be trying to take troops off.  Investigating."

"From general quietness and because eleven fires have been lit on drome it appears as though enemy might be preparing evacuation. .... Do any other reports from other sources show further evidence of this?"   

"Reliable reports state aerodrome occupied by own troops line now held EAST side of drome."

He would later that day take a different tone;

"Recent messages make position confused.  ....  Officers on ground believe enemy preparing for attack and take serious view.  I disagree but of course they have closer view."

1. Suda Bay is our main base.  It is also essential to the enemy.  Our immediate objective is to prevent the enemy from securing Suda Bay, he may have upwards of 10,000 men in contact with our troops holding Canea and Suda.

2. At Retimo and Heraklion parachutists having failed to clear the way for air transports have cut the northern coast road but it is hoped to open the road Heraklion-Suda for passage of reinforcements to Suda though our efforts have so far failed.  Although the enemy is making his main effort between Maleme and Suda there is still a danger of sea or airborne landings at Retimo and Heraklion which cannot therefore be altogether denuded of garrison even were the road open to reinforce Suda.